Abstract-An RFID system consists of an RFID reader, a server connected to a database, and RFID tags attached to the objects needed to be identified. We are interested in the case where two tags are needed to be simultaneously scanned in a reader's field, for which many protocols have been proposed in literature. They however are all insecure for the special case, where an adversary, acting as a reader, can penetrate the server and access data stored in the server. In this paper, we propose a protocol to remedy this problem for two-tag environment. In addition, it can be extended to more-than-two-tag environment without much increasing total amount of time to scan all the tags.
I. INTRODUCTION Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a technology for automated identification. An RFID system typically consists of servers, RFID readers, and RFID tags, where the readers and the tags communicate with one another via radio frequency waves. Its advantages over a barcode system [1] , include multiple RFID tags reading without line-of-sight, and high data storage capacity in an RFID tag. Due to its capability, RFID has been widely used in several applications, such as transport systems, electronic ticketing, access control, animal identification, logistics and supply chain management [1] . Although RFID has many benefits, but in practice it has some privacy and security issues needed to be addressed [2] . A lot of research works has been conducted to solve such problems.
Normally, before data transmission between a reader and a tag begins, the reader needs to authenticate the tag to ensure that the tag is known to the reader. In this paper, we are interested in the case where two tags are needed to be simultaneously scanned in a reader's field, and verified by the server. This case is very crucial in pharmaceutica distribution, especially in the case where some medications are required to be dispensed with leaflet describing its side-effects [3] . Many protocols to scan two tags simultaneously have been proposed in the literature. The "Yoking proof" was proposed by Juels [3] for scanning two tags simultaneously. Nonetheless, "Yoking proof" is not immune against a "replay attack" as described in [4] . Therefore, Saito and Sakurai proposed a "Yoking proof using time stamp" or a "Grouping proof" [4] to prevent a "replay attack." However, "Grouping proof" is also not immune to a "replay attack" if the time stamp used is somehow known to an adversary. As a result, Piramuthu proposed a "Modified proof" [5] to solve this problem. This modified proof is still vulnerable to the attack where an adversary acting as a reader can penetrate the server and gain access the information needed in the process of simultaneous tags scanning. We propose a protocol that addresses this vulnerability and can be extended to the case where there are more than two tags to be scanned simultaneously in a parallel manner.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly describes the existing proofs for scanning two tags simultaneously. We propose a new protocol called "Proposed proof" in Section III. Section IV discusses some security issues related to the "Proposed proof." Finally, Section IV concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
In this section, we briefly describe three protocols used to scan two tags simultaneously in a reader's field, namely, "Yoking proof," "Grouping proof," and "Modified proof." Before explaining these protocols, we define some notations that will be used throughout this paper. T are simultaneously present A. Yoking Proof Juels proposed a "Yoking proof" protocol [3] for an RFID reader to scan two RFID tags simultaneously, and the result of the scan is sent to a server for verification, as shown in Fig. 1 
Notation:
• A T ,
B. Grouping Proof
Saito and Sakurai [4] have shown that the Yoking proof can be attacked by a "replay attack," where two tags can be correctly verified although they are not present at the same time. Figure 2 illustrates the "fake" reader can compute AB P and send it to the server for verification since the adversary has complete control over the content of what is submitted to the verifier [5] .
Therefore, Saito and Sakurai proposed a "Grouping proof" or a "Yoking proof using time stamp (TS)" [4] , as depicted in Fig. 3 . The idea is that because TS changes every time, it will thus be used to generate a MAC instead of using a random number. 
C. Modified Proof
Piramuthu has shown that "Grouping proof" can also be attacked by a "replay attack" for a specific case [5] , as illustrated in Fig. 4 . That is, if the adversary somehow knows TS, he/she can then perform a replay attack when both tags are separated. This is because A m is independent of B T , although Accordingly, Piramuthu proposed a "Modified proof" [5] , as shown in Fig. 5 III. PROPOSED PROOF Our goal is to propose a protocol that can prevent the adversary generating a proof, denoted as "fake proof", and a replay attack under the assumption that a reader has limited time to create a valid proof. Therefore, if the time used to generate a proof exceeds an allowable time, the server will reject that proof, and the reader has to restart the proof generating process.
We propose two mechanisms: one to authenticate a reader to the server and the other one to prevent a replay attack. For the server to authenticate a reader, both should have a shared secret key that can be used for MAC generation. To prevent a replay attack, a reader creates a proof based on a random number, collaboratively generated by all the tags and the server, and secret keys shared between each tag and the server. Figure 6 illustrates the proposed protocol, which can be explained as follows:
1) The reader queries the server, and the server reacts by sending a random number r to the reader.
2) The reader queries A T and B T by sending "Hello. 3 6) The reader sends AB P to the server for verification.
Additionally, the proposed proof can also be extended to scan more than two tags simultaneously. That is, the reader gets r from the server and sends it to all the tags, the tags then react by generating and transmitting i r ( i is a tag number from 1 to n) to reader. The reader computes T r using IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS The proposed protocol can scan two tags simultaneously and requires the combined presence of the two tags in a reader's field. Therefore, it can prevent a fake proof and a replay attack. Based on security analysis from Dimitriou [6] , below are some issues of our proposed proof.
1) Attack on a tag: In this case, the adversary pretends to be a trusted reader and generates a proof to get verified by a server. However, the server will not accept this proof because the adversary does not know the secret key R x used to generate R m . Therefore, the adversary cannot get verified by the server. Likewise, a replay attack does not work in this case because A m and B m all depend on A r , B r , and r .
2) Attack on the reader: The adversary pretends to be an RFID tag. An attack on the reader does not succeed because the server knows and the secret keys of the two tags ( A x and B x ).
3) Attack on the communication between tag and reader:
The adversary can eavesdrop a communication between the reader and tags to get information necessary to generate a proof. Nonetheless, the server rejects this proof because the value of r changes all times and cannot be reused. In addition, the adversary cannot generate R m because he/she does not know the secret key ( A x and B x ).
4) Attack on user privacy:
In this paper, we consider the public communication, where the adversary can eavesdrop a communication between the reader and tags. Thus, we will not mention about this security issue.
5) Attack on location privacy:
Because the data used in communication changes every times, the adversary cannot reuse that data to generate a proof. Then, the proposed protocol immunes to this attack.
6) Attack against the key:
The adversary wants to know the key used in data communication. This problem can be ignored if the key is chosen carefully [7] . Thus, we disregard this attack.
7) Attack against implementation:
Similarly, if the keys and the random numbers used in the protocol are selected carefully, this problem is negligible. Then, we will not mention about this attack.
8) Disassembling the tags:
When the two tags disassemble, the adversary cannot generate a proof for verification because the two tags depend on each other. Thus, the proposed protocol is immune to this attack.
V. CONCLUSION We briefly described the authentication protocols to scan two tags simultaneously. Several protocols have been proposed in the literature. However, for a specific case, where the adversary, acting as a reader, can penetrate the server and gain access to data stored on the server, the existing protocols are not immune to a replay attack and a fake proof. Here, we proposed a protocol that addresses this problem. The idea is that the proposed proof must have a secret key known to the server. The reader generates the MAC to identify itself to the server, using that secret key. Based on security analysis, we found that our proposed proof is immune to a fake proof and a replay attack. Although, the security becomes strong in our situation, the reader requires high computation to compute the MAC.
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